Attention · Chapter 11

The Sovereign Faculty

William James, Simone Weil, and the Moral Weight of Patient Notice

In his landmark 1890 treatise The Principles of Psychology, the Harvard physician and philosopher William James devoted an entire chapter to the mechanics of attention and arrived at a conclusion that bridged empirical physiology with moral philosophy. James observed that no human being can hold an unchanging thought stably in mind for more than a few seconds at a time. Left to itself, the stream of consciousness perpetually slides off its chosen object, pulled away by peripheral sensations, associations, and habitual daydreams. What distinguishes a disciplined mind is never the absence of wandering, wrote James, but the quiet, unglamorous act of voluntarily bringing back a wandering attention over and over again—a faculty he identified as the very root of judgment, character, and will.

James went further, arguing that an education that systematically trained this faculty of voluntary retrieval would be the education par excellence, though he candidly admitted it was easier to define that ideal than to hand a student practical instructions for achieving it. Why did James equate the control of attention with free will itself? Inside the fifty-bit bottleneck of human awareness, an action is almost never decided by a theatrical spasm of willpower at the final instant of choice. Instead, we act on whatever idea holds the center of the mental stage long enough to recruit motor circuits and crowd rival impulses out of working memory. By choosing which thought to hold before the mind's eye for an extra three seconds, attention selects the reality to which the person responds.

Half a century later, in the 1940s, the French philosopher Simone Weil and the Oxford moral philosopher Iris Murdoch extended James's psychological insight into the foundation of ethics, while overturning a critical misconception about how attention actually works. In her 1942 essay on the spiritual and intellectual value of school studies, Weil observed that most people confuse attention with a muscular effort—furrowing the brow, clenching the jaw, holding the breath, and straining toward a problem. That tense muscular contraction produces only academic fatigue and narrow, ego-driven grasping.

Genuine attention, Weil argued, is the exact opposite of muscular strain. It consists of suspending one's hasty categorical judgments, leaving one's internal knowledge available yet ungrasped, and waiting patiently in an open, receptive state so that the truth of the theorem, the poem, or the suffering human being in front of you can enter undistorted. Looking at a stranger in affliction and asking what they are actually going through requires the rarest act of the human mind. The defensive ego constantly rushes in to project its own impatience, stereotypes, or self-importance onto the scene.

In The Sovereignty of Good in 1970, Iris Murdoch named this discipline unselfing—the patient, loving gaze directed upon an individual reality outside oneself, whether a hovering kestrel outside a window or another person in an everyday family conflict, that quiets the anxious, self-aggrandizing narrator of the Default Mode Network. Modern contemplative neuroscience has verified the physiological reality of Weil and Murdoch's non-grasping notice in the laboratory. In 2008, neuroscientists Heleen Slagter and Richard Davidson at the University of Wisconsin recorded brain potentials from practitioners who had completed three months of intensive open-monitoring contemplation, training the mind to notice sensory events without emotionally clinging to or elaborating on them. When tested on the rapid serial visual presentation stream that normally blinds human observers for half a second after catching a first target, the practitioners reduced the P3b cortical resources over-invested in the first target and nearly eliminated the attentional blink, catching the trailing second target with eighty percent accuracy.